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Reconsidering Severe or Pervasive:
Aligning the Standard in Sexual Harassment and
Racial Harassment Causes of Action
HEATHER L. KLEINSCHMIDT*
INTRODUCTION
When the United States Supreme Court first recognized sexual harassment as a form
of employment discrimination in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson,' the Court employed
lower court decisions regarding racial harassment in determining that a hostile work
environment can provide the basis for a claim of sexual harassment.2 Since this
decision, lower courts have used the Supreme Court's analogy between racial
harassment and sexual harassment to guide them when deciding open questions of law
in both racial harassment and sexual harassment cases. But do the lower courts actually
employ the same standards for racial harassment and sexual harassment claims? Should
courts employ the same standards? Analyzing these comparisons is vital in determining
what approach a court will take in the future when an open question of law in a case of
one type of harassment, racial or sexual, has been answered by a case dealing with the
other type of harassment. Although some courts claim that they are using the same
legal standards, they often differ in how they apply these standards depending on
whether they are confronted with a case of sexual harassment or racial harassment.
This Note focuses on courts' application of the "severe or pervasive" standard that
is employed both in sexual harassment and racial harassment cases to determine
whether a hostile work environment exists. Part I examines the legal origins of the
analogy between racial harassment and sexual harassment in the context of the "severe
or pervasive" standard. Part II argues that courts, particularly the Seventh Circuit, have
applied the "severe or pervasive" standard differently depending on whether they are
confronted with a case of sexual harassment or racial harassment. In practice, the
Seventh Circuit has developed a "severe and pervasive" standard for sexual
harassment cases, while using the "severe or pervasive" standard for racial harassment
cases. The Court's approach, therefore, makes it more difficult for a sexual harassment
plaintiff to establish a hostile work environment. A minority of courts have gone even
further than the Seventh Circuit, moving towards a "severe andpervasive" standard for
both sexual and racial harassment. Because courts rarely explain the reasons for the
different treatment of racial harassment and sexual harassment cases, Part III explores
some possible explanations for the discrepancy. Part IV argues that courts, such as the
Seventh Circuit, should align sexual harassment standards with racial harassment
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1. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
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INDIANA LA WJOURNAL
standards by employing the "severe or pervasive" standard mandated by the Supreme
Court.
I. LEGAL ORIGINS OF THE ANALOGY BETWEEN SEXUAL HARASSMENT
AND RACIAL HARASSMENT
A. Legal Standards of Sexual Harassment and Racial Harassment
Plaintiffs can sue employers for either racial harassment or sexual harassment under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Title VII provides that
[ilt shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer.., to fail or refuse
to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.
3
Although Title VII does not explicitly mention either sexual harassment or racial
harassment as a form of discrimination, the Supreme Court in Meritor Savings Bank v.
Vinson ruled that sexual harassment was illegal sex discrimination under Title VII.4
Courts apply the following legal standards in determining whether actionable sexual
harassment or racial harassment has occurred. Sexual harassment is harassing conduct
that took place because of the victim's sex, while racial harassment is harassing
conduct that took place because of the victim's race. For harassing conduct to be
actionable, the conduct must be unwelcome. 5 "Unwelcome" does not mean
"involuntary;" conduct can be unwelcome even if victims were not forced to join in the
conduct against their will.
6
In addition to the unwelcomeness requirement, the conduct must also affect a term
or condition of employment.7 Courts recognize two types of harassment that affect the
terms or conditions of employment. The first type, quid pro quo harassment, is defined
as a loss of economic or other tangible employment benefits that result when the victim
rejects the employer's harassing demands. 8 The second type, hostile work environment
harassment, is defined as harassment that is so severe or pervasive that it alters the
terms or conditions of the victim's working environment. 9 The severe or pervasive
standard has both subjective and objective components. Not only must the victim
perceive that the work environment is abusive, but a reasonable person must also view
3. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (2000).
4. 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986). Lower courts had previously determined that racial
harassment was a form of racial discrimination. See, e.g., Rogers v. Equal Employment
Opportunity Comm'n, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1972); Calcote v. Texas Educ. Found., 458
F.Supp. 231, 237 (W.D. Tex. 1976).
5. Meritor Sav. Bank, 477 U.S. at 68.
6. Id.
7.Id. at 67.
8. Id. at 65. Examples of quid pro quo sexual harassment include firing, demoting, or
refusing to promote the victim after the victim does not acquiesce to the harasser's demands for
sexual intercourse.
9. Id. at 67.
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the environment as abusive.10 Determining whether a working environment is hostile
requires an examination of the totality of the circumstances."
When determining whether employers are liable for the conduct of their employees
accused of harassment, courts look to who engaged in the harassing conduct.
Employers are strictly liable for the harassing conduct of their supervisors.'2 If the
supervisor took tangible employment action against the victim, the employer does not
get an affirmative defense.' 3 If there was no tangible employment action taken by the
supervisor, the employer gets an affirmative defense if the employer proves: (1) that it
took reasonable action to prevent the harm and to correct the harassment; and (2) that
the victim "unreasonably failed to take advantage of preventive or corrective
opportunities" or to avoid harm.14 Employers are liable for harassing acts of their non-
supervisory employees under a standard similar to that of negligence-employers will
be liable if they knew or should have known about the harassing conduct. 5 Employers
are also liable for the harassing behavior of non-employees if they knew or should have
known about the harassing conduct and if they had control over the behavior of the
non-employees.
6
B. The Analogy between Racial Harassment and Sexual Harassment.- Recognition
of the "Severe or Pervasive" Standard in Cases of Hostile Work Environment
The analogy between racial harassment and sexual harassment developed as courts
began to recognize hostile work environment claims as actionable under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Rogers v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
17
was the first case to hold that a hostile work environment could create an actionable
case of racial discrimination.' 8 The plaintiff, a Hispanic woman working in an
optometrist's office, filed a complaint after her employer segregated his Hispanic
patients from his white patients.19 Upon finding that the plaintiff's claim sufficiently
established a Title VII violation, the court explained that "the phrase 'terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment' in [Title VII] is an expansive concept which
sweeps within its protective ambit the practice of creating a working environment
heavily charged with ethnic or racial discrimination."20 Thus, the employer's
segregation of patients constituted a hostile work environment because the employer
21
created an environment permeated with racial discrimination.
10. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993).
ll.Id. at 23.
12. Faragher v. Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 804-05 (1998).
13. Id. at 808. For example, the employer does not get an affirmative defense if the
supervisor fired or demoted the victim.
14. Id. at 807.
15. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (d) (2004).
16. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (e) (20004).
17. 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1972).
18. Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986).
19. Rogers, 454 F.2d at 236.
20. Id. at 238.
21. See id. at 238-39.
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Lower courts followed the lead of the Rogers court in cases involving race. For
example, in Calcote v. Texas EducationalFoundation,22 a white plaintiff alleged that
his African-American supervisor harassed him by talking down to the plaintiff, writing
a deficiency report on the plaintiff, and generally frustrating the plaintiff because of his
race.23 Although the court ultimately decided the case on alternative grounds, it
recognized that racial harassment can form the basis of a Title VII claim when the
harassing conduct creates an environment charged with discrimination.2
Claims of racial harassment and sexual harassment were first analogized in Henson
v. Dundee.25 The plaintiff, a female dispatcher for a police department, claimed that the
chief of police uttered demeaning sexual vulgarities and requested that she engage in
sexual relations with him. 26 Finding that a hostile work environment could provide the
basis of a sexual harassment claim just as it could provide the basis of a racial
harassment claim, the court wrote:
[s]exual harassment which creates a hostile or offensive environment for members
of one sex is every bit the arbitrary barrier to sexual equality at the workplace
that racial harassment is to racial equality. Surely, a requirement that a man or
woman run a gauntlet of sexual abuse in return for the privilege of being allowed
to work and make a living can be as demeaning and disconcerting as the harshest
of racial epithets.2 7
The court then remanded the case for a determination of whether the police chiefs
conduct created a hostile work environment.28
The Supreme Court, in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson,29 cited with approval the
analogy between racial harassment and sexual harassment employed in Henson. The
plaintiff brought an action against her former employer, claiming that while she was
employed at the bank, her supervisor sexually harassed her when he made repeated
requests for sexual favors, fondled her, exposed himself, and raped her.3° The Court
found that the district court erred in dismissing the plaintiff's claim.3' In reaching this
decision, the Court recognized that a hostile work environment is actionable
discrimination under Title VII. 32 The Court cited Rogers as the first case that identified
hostile work environment as actionable.33 The Court also observed that, following
Rogers, lower courts acknowledged hostile work environment as actionable in cases of
racial harassment. 34 The court concluded that "[n]othing in Title VII suggests that a
hostile work environment based on discriminatory sexual harassment should not be
22. 458 F.Supp. 231 (W.D. Tex. 1976).
23. Id. at 237.
24. Id.
25. 682 F.2d 897 (1 1th Cir. 1982).
26. Id. at 902.
27. Id. (emphasis added).
28. Id. at 901.
29. 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986).
30. Id. at 60.
31.Id. at 73.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 65-66.
34. Id. at 66.
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likewise prohibited., 35 The Court then used the Henson standard, explaining that "[f]or
sexual harassment to be actionable, it must be sufficiently severe or pervasive 'to alter
the conditions of [the victim's] employment and create an abusive working
environment."' 36 The Court remanded the case so that the lower court could decide
whether the employer's conduct was severe or pervasive enough to create a hostile
work environment.
37
More than fifteen years later, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that the analogy
between racial harassment and sexual harassment was proper. In National Railroad
Passenger Corp. v. Morgan,38 the Court decided its first case of racial harassment. The
African-American plaintiff alleged that since the time of his hiring, he had been subject
to consistent harassment, which included utterances of racial epithets by managers,
refusals to allow him to participate in an apprenticeship program, and numerous
"written counselings" for absenteeism.39 The Court resolved the case using the
continuing violation theory for Title VII claims.40 When making its decision, the Court
stated that hostile work environment racial harassment and sexual harassment claims
are reviewed under the same standard.41 The Court applied the "severe or pervasive"
standard it developed for sexual harassment cases involving hostile work environments
to this racial harassment case.42
II. SEVERE OR PERVASIVE CONDUCT IN THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT: SAME LEGAL
STANDARD, DIFFERENT APPLICATION
After Meritor and National Railroad, one might think that the Supreme Court
requires lower courts to treat cases of racial harassment and sexual harassment the
same using the "severe or pervasive" standard. Indeed, courts say that they are using
the same legal standards when deciding whether racially or sexually harassing conduct
rises to the level of an actionable hostile work environment claim. Although courts
claim to use the same "severe or pervasive" standard, they often differ when applying
it. These differences are revealed when analyzing courts' definitions of the severe or
pervasive conduct that gives rise to a hostile work environment claim.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 67 (alteration in original) (quoting Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904
(1 th Cir. 1982)).
37. See id. at 73.
38. 536 U.S. 101 (2002).
39. Id. at 106 n.l.
40. See id. at 122. The Court held that claims of hostile work environment are not time
barred if at least one of the harassing acts is within the time period for filing a claim and if all
the harassing conduct is part of the same employment practice. Id. at 122. It acknowledged that
hostile work environment claims often involve harassing conduct that is repeated over a period
of time. See id. at 115. Because these claims are based on the collective effect of these acts, the
acts together form a single, unlawful employment practice; the acts constitute one continuing
violation of Title VII. See id. at 117.
41. Id. at 116 n.10.
42. See id.
2005] 1123
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A. Origins of the Severe or Pervasive Standard
In Meritor, the Court found that for conduct to create a hostile work environment,
"it must be sufficiently severe or pervasive 'to alter the conditions of [the victim's]
employment. -' 4 3 The Court clarified the severe or pervasive standard in Harris v.
Forklift Systems."4 The plaintiff claimed that the president of Forklift Systems made
sexual innuendos towards her and insulted her due to her gender. 4' The Court
remanded the case because the district court erred when applying the severe or
pervasive standard in deciding that the alleged conduct did not create a hostile work
46environment. The Supreme Court held that the severe or pervasive standard has both
subjective and objective components. 7 Not only must the victim perceive that the
work environment is abusive, but a reasonable person must also view the environment
as abusive.4 8 The Court further explained that to determine whether an environment is
hostile it must examine the totality of the circumstances. 49 Factors which can be
considered include: "the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether
it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it
unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance." 50 Thus, the victim
does not have to suffer psychological injury or any other tangible injury to be
successful on a claim of hostile work environment harassment.5'
B. Same Standards, Different Application: An Examination of the Seventh Circuit's
Sexual Harassment and Racial Harassment Decisions
Lower courts now use the severe or pervasive standard defined in Meritor and
explained in Harris when deciding cases of both sexual harassment and racial
harassment. Following Harris, lower courts began to apply the severe or pervasive
standard when deciding cases of sexual harassment, citing Harris when reaching their
decisions. 2 Lower courts deciding cases of racial harassment also cited the Supreme
43. Meritor Say. Bank v. Vincent, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986) (alteration in original)
(quoting Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 902 (1 1th Cir. 1982)).
44. 510 U.S. 17, 21-23 (1993).
45.Id. at 19.
46. Id. at 22. The district court erroneously held that in order to be severe or pervasive,
the conduct had to seriously alter the plaintiff's psychological well-being or cause her to suffer
injury. See id. at 20.
47.Id. at 21.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 23.
50. Id.
51. See id. at 22.
52. E.g., Beardsley v. Webb, 30 F.3d 524, 529 (4th Cir. 1994); Steiner v. Showboat
Operating Co., 25 F.3d 1459, 1462-63 (9th Cir. 1994); Nash v. Electropace Sys., Inc., 9 F.3d
401,403-04 (5th Cir. 1993); Saxton v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 10 F.3d 526, 533 (7th Cir. 1993);
Cosgrove v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 9 F.3d 1033, 1042 (2d Cir. 1993).
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Court's sexual harassment decisions regarding the severe or pervasive standard, stating
that the same standard applies to both."
Although lower courts use the severe or pervasive standard that was developed in
Meritor and Harris in both sexual harassment and racial harassment cases, courts often
differ in applying the standard. Conduct that has been deemed severe or pervasive in
cases of racial harassment has not been found to be severe or pervasive in the context
of sexual harassment. The plaintiff must suffer from more egregious conduct to win on
a sexual harassment claim than for a plaintiff to win on a racial harassment claim. This
Note suggests that these courts, particularly the Seventh Circuit, have moved towards a
standard of severe and pervasive conduct for actionable sexual harassment claims,
while staying true to the Supreme Court's severe or pervasive standard for actionable
racial harassment claims.
54
The different treatment of racial harassment cases and sexual harassment cases by
many courts is apparent when examining decisions of the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit. 55 Following the Harris decision in 1993, the Seventh Circuit was one
of the first circuits to apply the Supreme Court's severe or pervasive standard.
Immediately following Harris, the Seventh Circuit decided two cases of sexual
harassment and one case of racial harassment. These decisions provide a stark contrast
in the way courts treat racial harassment and sexual harassment. In the case of racial
harassment, one utterance of a racial epithet was deemed sufficiently severe for an
actionable hostile work environment claim. However, in the cases of sexual
harassment, multiple physical advances coupled with sexual comments were neither
severe nor pervasive enough for an actionable hostile work environment claim.
In Rodgers v. Western-Southern Life Insurance Co.,5 6 the Seventh Circuit found
that even one utterance of a racial epithet was sufficient to give rise to a claim of
hostile work environment racial harassment. The plaintiff, an African-American
insurance sales manager, claimed that his white supervisor called him a "nigger" twice
and said that "[y]ou black guys are too fucking dumb to be insurance agents.,57 The
court held that this conduct was sufficient to establish a claim of hostile work
53. E.g., Hawkins v. Pepsi Co., Inc., 203 F.3d 274, 281 (4th Cir. 2000); Jackson v.
Quanex Corp., 191 F.3d 647, 658-59 (6th Cir. 1999); Barbour v. Browner, 181 F.3d 1342,
1347-48 (D.C. Cir. 1999); Gipson v. KAS Snacktime Co., 171 F.3d 574, 578 (8th Cir. 1999).
54. Judith J. Johnson has also suggested that courts are moving towards a severe and
pervasive standard for sexual harassment cases. Judith J. Johnson, License to Harass Women:
Requiring Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment to be "Severe or Pervasive " Discriminates
Among "Terms and Conditions" of Employment, 62 MD. L. REV. 85, 111-19 (2003). She also
argues that courts merely "give lip service to the requirement that racial harassment be severe or
pervasive." Id. at 122. This Note, however, proposes that most courts have stayed true to the
Supreme Court's "severe or pervasive" standard. A minority of courts have even applied the
more stringent "severe and pervasive" standard to racial harassment cases. See infra Part II.C.
55. For an in-depth discussion of two of the Seventh Circuit's differing decisions, see
Robert J. Gregory, You Can Call Me a "Bitch "Just Don't Use the "N-word": Some Thoughts on
Galloway v. General Motors Service Parts Operations and Rodgers v. Western-Southern Life
Insurance Co., 46 DEPAUL L. REV. 741 (1997). This Note suggests that the differing approaches
that Gregory discusses are due to the Seventh Circuit's use of a severe and pervasive standard
for sexual harassment cases.
56. 12 F.3d 668, 671 (7th Cir. 1993).
57. Id. at 671.
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environment. In reaching this conclusion, the court wrote: "Perhaps no single act can
more quickly 'alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive working
environment' than the use of an unambiguous racial epithet such as 'nigger' by a
supervisor in the presence of his subordinate."58 The court, therefore, indicated its
belief that the use of one racial epithet was severe enough to be actionablef
9
In contrast, the Seventh Circuit has held that even physical contact with the plaintiff
was not severe. In Saxton v. American Telephone Telegraph Co.,60 the plaintiff stated
she went out one evening with her supervisor to discuss her dissatisfaction with herjob
assignment.6 1 During that meeting, the supervisor rubbed his hand on the plaintiff's
upper thigh, placed his hand on the plaintiff's knee several times, and kissed her.6 2 On
a separate occasion, the supervisor leapt out from behind some bushes and attempted
to grab the plaintiff.63 The court found that the supervisor's behavior was "relatively
limited" as there were only two instances of offensive conduct; the harassment,
therefore, was not pervasive. 64 Regarding the severity prong, the court acknowledged
that "[c]ertainly any employee in Saxton's position might have experienced significant
discomfort and distress as the result of her superior's uninvited and unwelcome
advances."65 While that supervisor's conduct could have made the plaintiff's job
"subjectively unpleasant," his behavior was "merely offensive." 66 The court found,
therefore, that the supervisor's conduct was not severe. Thus, the court held that
although the supervisor's conduct was "undoubtedly inappropriate," it was neither
67severe nor pervasive enough to create a hostile work environment.
Likewise, in Weiss v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co.,68 the court found multiple
occurrences of sexually harassing conduct insufficient to be actionable. 69 Here, the
plaintiff claimed that her supervisor called her a dumb blond, asked her out on dates,
placed "I love you" signs in her work station, placed his hand on her shoulder on
several occasions, and tried to kiss her three times.70 The court found that these
incidents were "relatively isolated" and not serious. 7' The supervisor's conduct,
therefore, did not produce a hostile work environment.
72
58. Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67
(1986)).
59. See id.
60. 10 F.3d 526 (7th Cir. 1993).
61. Id. at 528.
62. Id. The plaintiff and supervisor met at a nightclub. Later that evening, they drove to
a jazz club where the harassing conduct took place. Id.
63. Id. After the two of them met for lunch, the supervisor took a walk. The plaintiff
decided to take a walk by herself. While she was walking the supervisor "lurched" behind the
bushes. Id.
64. Id. at 534.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 535.
67. Id. at 534.
68. 990 F.2d 333 (7th Cir. 1993).
69. Id. at 337.
70. Id. at 334-35.
71. Id. at 337.
72. See id.
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After its three initial decisions following Harris in 1993, the Seventh Circuit
continued to hold sexual harassment plaintiffs to a higher standard than racial
harassment plaintiffs. For example, Galloway v. General Motors Service Parts
Operations73 provides a stark contrast to the court's earlier holding that a single
utterance of "nigger" is severe enough to be actionable under Title VII. In Galloway,
the plaintiff claimed that a co-worker repeatedly called her a "sick bitch. 7 4 He also
told her, "If you don't want me, bitch, you won't have a damn thing," and on a separate
occasion he said, "Suck this, bitch," while making an obscene gesture towards her.
75
The court held that the term "bitch" is not gender or sex related because although
[iut is true that "bitch" is rarely used of heterosexual males .... [I]t does not
necessarily connote some specific female characteristic, whether true, false, or
stereotypical; it does not draw attention to the woman's sexual or maternal
characteristics or to other respects in which women might be thought to be inferior
to men in the workplace, or unworthy of equal dignity and respect. In its normal
usage, it is simply a pejorative term for "woman."76
The court found that the co-worker's use of "bitch" was motivated by personal
animosity towards the plaintiff and not by her gender.77 Because the court found that
the utterances were not made because of the plaintiff's gender, the court did not even
reach the issue of whether they were severe or pervasive. 78 The court suggested,
however, that even if the utterances were gender motivated, they still would not
constitute a hostile work environment because they were "too tepid or intermittent or
equivocal to make a reasonable person believe that she has been discriminated against
on the basis of her sex.
7 9
When the Seventh Circuit finally arrived at the question of whether utterances that
are sexual in nature are severe or pervasive, the court held that claims based on sexual
utterances are not actionable under Title VII. The court reached this conclusion in
Baskersville v. Culligan International Co.80 and in Gleason v. Mesirow Financial,
Inc.81 In Baskerville, the plaintiff alleged numerous incidents of harassing conduct by
her supervisor that occurred over a period of seven months: when she commented on
how hot her supervisor's office was, he replied, "[n]ot until you stepped your foot in
here;" he said that an announcement over the public address meant that "pretty girls
run around naked" and he left an office party early because "he didn't want to lose
control" with all the attractive girls there.8 2 He also called her a "pretty girl" and a
"tilly," grunted when she wore a leather skirt, and made a masturbatory gesture
towards her.8 3 The court determined that "vulgar banter, tinged with sexual innuendo"
73. 78 F.3d 1164 (7th Cir. 1996).
74. Id. at 1165.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 1168.
77. Id.
78. See id.
79. Id.
80. 50 F.3d 428, 430-31 (7th Cir. 1995).
81. 118 F.3d 1134, 1143-46 (7th Cir. 1997).
82. Baskerville, 50 F.3d at 430.
83. Id.
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is inescapable in the workplace and that Title VII was not meant to eliminate such
vulgarity.8 4 The court held that the plaintiff did not have an actionable claim for sexual
harassment because the supervisor's utterances merely created a mildly offensive and
unpleasant working environment and were not, therefore, severe enough to be
actionable.
8 5
Similarly, the Gleason court held that sexual utterances, by themselves, were not
enough to form an actionable hostile work environment claim. In this case, the plaintiff
claimed that her manager said that female customers were "bitchy," "dumb," and
"suffering from PMS," made comments to female employees regarding breast sizes
and wearing tight skirts, flirted with the plaintiff's female relatives, ogled women as
they walked by his desk, and told the plaintiff he dreamt about holding her hand.8 6 The
court found that these comments were less egregious than the supervisor's comments in
Baskerville because they were directed at other women and did not involve the plaintiff
personally. 87 The court recognized that the supervisor's many comments were juvenile
and inappropriate.8 8 It held, however, that this "low-level harassment" was not severe
enough to constitute a hostile work environment.89 The plaintiff's claim, therefore, was
not actionable.
90
In contrast to the Seventh Circuit's decisions regarding the severity of sexual
utterances, the court held that racial comments continued to be severe or pervasive
enough to be actionable. In Cerros v. Steel Technologies, Inc.,91 the Latino plaintiff
alleged that his white supervisor called him "spic," "wetback," "brown boy," "Javier,"
and "Julio."92 He also alleged that racist graffiti, including "White power," "Tony
Cerros is a spic," and "go back to Mexico," was written on bathroom walls.93 The court
held that the lower court erred in granting summary judgment to the employer. 94 It
found that unambiguous racial epithets fell on the more severe end of the hostile work
environment spectrum. 95 It concluded that these comments were highly offensive;
therefore, it was possible that this conduct was severe or pervasive. 96 Thus, the
defendant sufficiently made an actionable hostile work environment claim.
97
84. Id. at 430-31.
85. Id. When reaching its decision, the court took its focus away from what the
supervisor did do and placed it on what the supervisor did not do: he did not touch the plaintiff;
he did not invite her to have sexual relations with him; he did not threaten her; and he did not
expose himself to her. Because he did none of these things, the plaintiff did not have an
actionable claim. Id.
86. Gleason, 118 F.3d at 1137.
87. Id. at 1144.
88. Id. at 1145.
89.Id. at 1144, 1146.
90. Id. at 1146.
91. 288 F.3d 1040 (7th Cir. 2002).
92. Id. at 1042.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 1048.
95. Id. at 1047.
96. ld. at 1046-47.
97.1d. at 1048.
98. 218 F.3d 798 (7th Cir. 2000).
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It is possible for a plaintiff in the Seventh Circuit to win on a hostile work
environment sexual harassment claim, but the plaintiff must show forceful physical
contact coupled with sexual utterances in order for the conduct to be deemed severe or
pervasive. Hostetler v. Quality Dining, Inc.98 provides an example of conduct deemed
to be actionable. The plaintiff claimed that a supervisory employee grabbed her face
and kissed her, sticking his tongue down her throat. 99 The next day, he came up behind
the plaintiff, took her face in his hand, tried to kiss her, and began to unfasten her
brassiere; when she resisted he laughed and said he would "undo it all the way."'00 On
a separate occasion, the employee told the plaintiff that his ability to perform oral sex
was so excellent that she "would do cartwheels" if he performed this sex act on her. l
When deciding this case, the court described the line between actionable conduct and
non-actionable conduct as a continuum-at one end lies sexual assault and at the other
end lies the occasional sexual utterance. 02 It held that whether the conduct in the case
at bar was objectively severe or pervasive was a close question, but that the claim fell
on the actionable side of the line. 10 3 The court saw the conduct in question as "forcible
physical contact of a rather intimate nature" and the utterance as more than a casual
obscenity. 104 Furthermore, the employee's actions were more severe than the attempts
to kiss in Saxton and Weiss.10 5 The court held, therefore, that a fact finder could have
found that the conduct was severe or pervasive, and it reversed the district court's grant
of summary judgment for the employer.10 6
Some courts, particularly the Seventh Circuit, have different approaches as to what
constitutes severe or pervasive conduct depending on whether it is hearing a racial
harassment case or a sexual harassment case. 10 7 The court's decision in Cerros
demonstrates that utterances of racial epithets, by themselves, are severe or pervasive
enough to create an actionable hostile work environment. In fact, the court held in
Rodgers that a single utterance of the world "nigger" was severe enough to be
actionable. In contrast, the court held in Baskersville and Gleason that even multiple
utterances that were sexual in nature were not actionable because they were not severe.
When the sexual utterances were coupled with physical contact in Saxton and Weiss,
the court decided that this still was not severe enough to be actionable. Only in
Hostetler, when the utterance was combined with forceful physical contact (a forceful
kiss and unfastening a brassier) did the court find the conduct severe or pervasive. In
practice, therefore, successful sexual harassment plaintiffs are held to a high "severe
and pervasive" standard-the conduct must be both physically forceful and occur
multiple times.'0 8 In contrast, a successful racial harassment plaintiff is still held to the
severe or pervasive standard.
98. 218 F.3d 798 (7th Cir. 2000).
99. Id. at 802.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 807.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 807-08.
105. Id. at 808-09.
106. Id. at 811.
107. Gregory, supra note 55, at 740-41; Johnson, supra note 54, at 111-23.
108. Johnson, supra note 54, at I11.
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C. Is Severe and Pervasive Here to Stay? Implications for Racial Harassment
Cases
While the case law examined thus far reveals that some courts treat cases of racial
harassment and sexual harassment differently, there is an indication that other courts
are treating racial harassment and sexual harassment the same. However, these courts
are not using the severe or pervasive standard defined in Meritor and Harris. Courts,
in practice, are moving towards a severe and pervasive standard in sexual harassment
cases and are then importing this standard to cases of racial harassment. Some fear that
by using an analogy between racial harassment and sexual harassment, courts will find
that no matter how severe, a single instance of harassment will not constitute an
actionable claim for hostile work environment."' Employees, therefore, would be
forced to tolerate even the most severe harassment as long as it is an isolated
occurrence."10 The new severe and pervasive standard could trivialize the damage
created by a single incident of harassment by finding the incident not actionable."'
Case law indicates that there is substance to the argument that racial harassment
cases are being held to the higher severe and pervasive standards of sexual harassment
cases. In Motley v. Parker-Hannifan Corp., the African-American plaintiff alleged
three incidents of harassing conduct by his employer: first, an African-American doll
was hung in effigy; second, graffiti directed at the plaintiffwas written on a wall; third,
a flier was altered by darkening the face and labeling it with the plaintiff's name. 2
The court quoted Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., a hostile work environment sexual
harassment opinion, stating that claims
are characterized by multiple and varied combinations and frequencies of
offensive exposures, which characteristics would dictate an order of proof that
placed the burden upon the plaintiff to demonstrate that injury resulted not from a
single or isolated offensive incident, comment, or conduct, but from incidents,
comments, or conduct that occurred with some frequency."
3
Using Rabidue as its standard, the court held that the isolated incident of the doll
hung in effigy was not severe enough to establish a claim for a hostile work
environment. " 4 When this incident was coupled with the graffiti and the flier, the court
found that the conduct was still not severe or pervasive enough to constitute a hostile
work environment." 15
109. L. Camille H6bert, Analogizing Race and Sex in Workplace Harassment Claims,
58 OHIO ST. L.J. 819, 865 (1997). Although H6bert argues that some racial harassment cases are
being held to a higher standard, she does not argue that this is a severe and pervasive standard.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 866.
112. Motley v. Parker-Hannifan Corp., No. 1:94-CV-639, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7420,
at *1-3 (W.D. Mich. May 10, 1995).
113. Id. at *7 (quoting Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 620 (6th Cir.
1986)).
114. Id.
115. Id.
[Vol. 80:11191130
RECONSIDERING SEVERE OR PERVASIVE
Although the Seventh Circuit held in Rodgers that one utterance of the word
"nigger" is severe enough to be actionable, other circuits have found that utterances of
racial epithets are not severe enough to be actionable. One example is Hibbler v.
Regional Medical Center. " 6 The plaintiffalleged a single use of a racial epithet by her
supervisor." 7 The court wrote that unless the conduct was extreme, a single incident
was not severe or pervasive enough to be actionable.18 Although it found the use of
the epithet to be inexcusable, the court held that the remark did not create a hostile
work environment. "9
Even when utterances of racial epithets are combined with other harassing conduct,
some courts are now likely to find that the behavior is not severe or pervasive. In
Woodland v. Joseph T. Ryerson & Son, Inc., 120 the court held that racial epithets joined
with other behavior were not actionable. The plaintiff claimed that on multiple
occasions, employees used racial epithets directed at the plaintiff and other African-
American employees.'21 In addition, copies of a racist poem were distributed among
employees, and racist graffiti was written on the walls. 122 The court remarked that the
conduct was offensive and inexcusable. '23 However, the behavior was too sporadic to
be severe or pervasive.
24
Similarly, the court in Gipson v. KAS Snacktime Co. 2' held that use of the word
"nigger" combined with other conduct was not severe or pervasive enough to be
actionable. The African-American plaintiff alleged that at their first meeting, his white
supervisor refused to shake his hand and told the plaintiff to "[f]ire that fat black guy
that wears glasses, because he just doesn't fit in around here."' 126 The supervisor also
called the plaintiff a "dumb nigger" and made other trivializing comments, which
included demanding that the plaintiff quit because the company did not need "his
kind." 27 The supervisor even threatened to fire the plaintiff if he ever walked ahead of
the supervisor. 28 On several occasions, the supervisor said that if the plaintiff had
worked for him ten years ago, the supervisor would have "ripped his head off.,' 29 In
reaching its decision that the plaintiff did not make an actionable hostile work
environment claim, the court explicitly stated that it was using the same standard that it
used in sexual harassment cases. 3' The court acknowledged that the supervisor's
behavior was offensive and rude, but it was not severe or pervasive.
3 1
116. No. 00-6205, 2001 WL 700829 (6th Cir. June 12, 2001).
117. Id. at *2. The opinion did not provide the racial epithet that the supervisor used.
118. Id.
119.Id.
120. 302 F.3d 839 (8th Cir. 2002).
121. Id. at 843-44.
122. Id. at 844.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. 171 F.3d 574 (8th Cir. 1999).
126. Id. at 577.
127. Id. at 577-78.
128. id. at 577.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 578.
131. Id. at 580.
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Case law indicates that once some courts hold sexual harassment plaintiffs to what
is, in practice, a severe and pervasive standard, they import this tougher standard to
racial harassment plaintiffs. It is neither enough to allege a single, severe incident, nor
is it enough to allege repeated occurrences of harassing conduct. Hanging an African
American in effigy or using the word "nigger" is not actionable. Even when there are
multiple occurrences of racially harassing conduct, such as in Motley, Woodland, and
Gipson, some courts will not find the conduct pervasive. Thus, the conduct must be
both severe and pervasive to be actionable. These courts have imported the severe and
pervasive standard to racial harassment cases.
Although a minority of courts have begun to use this severe and pervasive standard
in both sexual harassment and racial harassment claims, the Supreme Court, in Meritor
and National Railroad, has required that both sexual harassment claims and racial
harassment claims be subject to the same severe or pervasive standard. Courts, in
practice, have not followed the Supreme Court's mandate to treat the two according to
the same severe or pervasive standard. For example, the Seventh Circuit has held
sexual harassment plaintiffs to a more stringent severe and pervasive standard, making
it tougher for sexual harassment plaintiffs to be successful than for racial harassment
plaintiffs. Part III will examine some explanations for why some courts treat sexual
harassment and racial harassment differently.
III. APPROPRIATENESS OF USING DIFFERENT STANDARDS FOR RACIAL HARASSMENT
AND SEXUAL HARASSMENT CLAIMS
When reaching decisions regarding cases of racial and sexual harassment, courts
rarely give satisfying explanations for why treatment of racial harassment cases and
sexual harassment cases differs. When deciding claims of hostile work environment
harassment, courts generally cite to Harris and federal appellate court opinions, and
then they simply reason that the conduct either is or is not severe or pervasive.
132
Commentators, therefore, are left to hypothesize why courts hold sexual harassment
plaintiffs to a higher standard than racial harassment plaintiffs. Several explanations
can be given for the different treatment of sexual harassment and racial harassment
cases. 133 First, sexual discrimination and racial discrimination are historically different;
this historical difference translates into different treatment in the legal system. Second,
despite the Supreme Court's recognition in Meritor that sexual harassment is a form of
sex discrimination, lower courts only grudgingly accepted sexual harassment as
actionable. Third, the term "race" as used in the harassment context has only one
denotation, while the term "sex" has two denotations. "Sex" can be used to denote
gender differences (male or female), and it can be used to describe sexuality (the
132. See supra Part II.B.
133. For other discussions of the reasons for differences between race and sex in
harassment cases, see H1bert, supra note 109, at 836-44; Gregory, supra note 55, at 772-75.
H~bert suggests the differences in the cases are a result of differences in historical context, the
victim's experience of harassment, and the harasser's motivation behind the harassing conduct.
H1bert, supra note 109, at 836-44. Gregory examines such factors as court's discomfort in
policing the "sexual give and take" that is part of the workplace courting ritual, the prevalence
of sexual misconduct in society, the ambiguities inherent in harassing utterances, and the
number of female and minority judges on the bench. Gregory, supra note 55, at 772-75.
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expression of sexual desires). The courts often view sexual harassment as an
expression of sexuality for which employers should not be held liable.
A. Historical Differences Between Race and Sex
One possible explanation for the different legal treatment of racial harassment and
sexual harassment cases is that race and sex are historically different; therefore, any
analogy between the two is not justified. In some ways, women and racial minorities
share a common history of deprivation of legal and political rights. 13 4 Until the late
nineteenth century, neither group could vote, hold office, bring a lawsuit, or serve on
juries. 35 Both groups have also historically been denied equal treatment in the
workplace.'36 For example, traditionally there have been "women'sjobs" and "African
American's jobs" that are lower paying than those jobs traditionally held by white
men. 137 However, some have argued that sexual discrimination has not left the same
legacy as racial discrimination and that subordination of women to men cannot
compare to slavery, segregation, and racially motivated hate crimes.' 38 When Frederick
Douglas called upon women to support suffrage for African Americans despite the
absence of suffrage for women, he pled:
When women, because they are women, are dragged from their homes and hung
upon lamp-posts; when their children are tom from their arms and their brains
dashed upon the pavement; when they are objects of insult and outrage at every
turn; when they are in danger of having their homes burnt down over their heads;
when their children are not allowed to enter schools; then they will have [the
same] urgency to obtain the ballot.' 39
Those who argue that race and sex should not be analogized often point out these
differences, claiming that analogizing race and sex threatens to trivialize the historical
violence against racial minorities.' 4° For example, when early feminists described
marriage as slavery, some argue this analogy of race and sex implied that slavery was
no worse than marriage.141
These historical differences have also translated into differences in the way that
women and racial minorities are treated in the legal system outside of Title VII. For
example, in Equal Protection Clause cases, classifications based on race are considered
suspect and are subject to strict scrutiny. 142 Classifications based on gender, however,
134. For an in-depth discussion of these historical differences, see H6bert, supra note
109, at 836-38.
135. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 685 (1973).
136. H6bert, supra note 109, at 837-38.
137. Id. at 838.
138. See id. at 837.
139. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting 2 HISTORY OF WOMEN'S SUFFRAGE 383
(Elizabeth Cady Stanton et al. eds., Susan Anthony 1976) (1881)).
140. H~bert, supra note 109, at 879-80.
141. Id. at 879 (citing ANGELA Y. DAVIS, WOMEN, RACE & CLASS 33-34 (1983)).
142. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
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are thought of as "quasi-suspect" classifications that are subject to a higher degree of
scrutiny than rational basis review but are not subject to strict scrutiny.1
43
B. Reluctance to Accept Sexual Harassment as Actionable Under Title VII
The different treatment of racial harassment and sexual harassment cases might also
be due to the reluctance of the federal government to accept sex discrimination as a
form of actionable discrimination. The disinclination of Congress to accept sex
discrimination as actionable is apparent in the limited legislative history of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.144 There is some indication that sex discrimination was
added at the last minute in order to defeat the bill's passage-the congressman who
introduced the sex discrimination provision into the bill believed that others in
Congress would think that extending protection to sex discrimination was absurd
because treating men and women in the workplace differently was acceptable.
1 45
However, the bill passed. 146
After Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964, federal courts hesitantly
accepted sexual harassment as an actionable claim under Title VII.147 Prior to 1977,
only five sexual harassment cases had been litigated under Title VII.1 41 Of these cases,
only one held that sexual harassment was actionable under Title VII. "' It was not until
143. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411
U.S. 677 (1973).
144. See 110 CONG. REc. 2577-84 (1964).
145. See, e.g., CHARLES W. WHALEN & BARBARA WHALEN, THE LONGEST DEBATE: A
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 115-18 (1985); Katherine M. Franke, The
Central Mistake of Sex Discrimination Law: The Disaggregation of Sex from Gender, 144 U.
PA. L. REV. 1, 23-25 (1995); Francis J. Vaas, Title VII: Legislative History, 7 B.C. INDus. &
COM. L. REV. 431, 441-43 (1966).
146. See 110 CONG. REc. 2584 (1964).
147. See LEX K. LARSON, LARSON ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 46.02 (2d ed.
2003); L. Camille H6bert, The Economic Implications of Sexual Harassment for Women, 3
KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 41, 42-44 (1994).
148. See Tomkins v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 422 F. Supp. 553, 556 (D.N.J. 1976)
(holding that Title VII was not meant to provide a remedy for "what amounts to a physical
attack motivated by sexual desire on the part of a supervisor and which happens to occur in a
corporate corridor rather than a back alley"); Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654, 657-60
(D.D.C. 1976) (finding that sexual harassment is actionable as sex discrimination under Title
VII and rejecting employer's argument that firing plaintiff for refusing the sexual advances of
her supervisor resulted from "an isolated personal incident which should not be the concern of
the courts and was not the concern of Congress in enacting Title VII"); Come v. Bausch &
Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161, 162-65 (D. Ariz. 1975) (holding that the supervisor's sexual
advances were not actionable under Title VII because the supervisor was merely satisfying a
personal desire and because his behavior was not conducted pursuant to a company policy);
Miller v. Bank of America, 418 F. Supp. 233,236 (D. Nev. 1974) (holding that Title VII could
not be used to hold an employer liable for the "natural sex phenomenon" of men's attraction to
women); Barnes v. Train, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 123, 124 (D.D.C. 1974) (holding that
sexual harassment was not actionable because the case was "a controversy underpinned by the
subtleties of an inharmonious personal relationship").
149. Williams, 413 F, Supp. at 657-60.
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the late 1970's that the tide began to turn for sexual harassment plaintiffs.150 Sexual
harassment as a cause of action did not gain judicial recognition until 1976.151 In
contrast, racial harassment was recognized as actionable under Title VII as early as
1971.152
C. Merely Misplaced Affection? "Sex" Versus "Sexual"
Courts might also treat cases of sexual harassment and racial harassment differently
because the term "race" as used in the harassment context has only one denotation,
while the term "sex" has two denotations. "Sex" can be used to denote gender
differences (male or female), and it can be used to describe sexuality (the expression of
sexual desires). 5 3 Courts have not had any trouble recognizing harassment based on
gender distinctions as actionable.' 54 However, the courts have struggled with
acknowledging harassment based on sexuality as actionable.'55
Courts are sometimes reluctant to accept harassment based on sexuality as
actionable because they perceive sexual activity in the workplace as unrelated to the
job. Harassers whose conduct is based on sexuality might have different motivations
for their behavior than harassers whose conduct is based on race or gender.' 56 Conduct
based on sexuality could be a misguided attempt to initiate romance or show affection;
courts do not want to interfere in failed "personal relationships" of employees.
157
Courts view this harassing behavior as merely natural and normal activity between co-
workers that should not expose the employer to liability.5 8 While some women are not
receptive to these sexual advances, some women welcome this behavior-courts do not
want to police office flirtations motivated by personal affection. These personal
motivations are lacking in cases of racial and gender harassment.
The courts' struggle to recognize harassment based on sexuality is apparent when
examining early sexual harassment decisions. In Barnes v. Train,15 9 the plaintiff was
fired when she refused to have sexual intercourse with her supervisor.' 60 Holding that
the plaintiff did not have a cause of action, the court wrote that this was "a controversy
underpinned by the subtleties of an inharmonious personal relationship" and was not
1662discrimination based on gender.161 Similarly, in Come v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc. ,162 the
150. See LARSON, supra note 147, § 46.02(1).
151. See Williams, 413 F. Supp. at 657; Note, Sexual Harassment Claims ofAbusive
Work Environment Under Title VII, 97 HARv. L. REV. 1449, 1449 (1984).
152. Sarah McLean, Comment, Harassment in the Workplace: When Will the Reactions
of Ethnic Minorities and Women Be Considered Reasonable?, 40 WASHBURN L.J. 593, 598
(2001).
153. LARSON, supra note 147, § 46.02(1).
154. See id.
155. Id.
156. See Hbert, supra note 109, at 842-43.
157. Id. at 843; Gregory, supra note 55, at 765-66.
158. Gregory, supra note 55, at 766; see also cases cited supra note 148.
159. 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 123 (D.D.C. 1974).
160. Id. at 124.
161. Id.
162. 390 F. Supp. 161, 163 (D. Ariz. 1975).
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court described the supervisor's sexual advances as "nothing more than a personal
proclivity, peculiarity or mannerism ... satisfying a personal urge."1 63 The court also
explained, "It would be ludicrous to hold that the sort of activity involved here was
contemplated by the Act .... [A]n outgrowth of [such a holding] would be a potential
federal lawsuit every time any employer made amorous or sexually oriented advances
toward another."' 64 Again, the court held that the plaintiff did not have a cause of
action. 65 These decisions indicate that courts believed that harassment based on
sexuality was not motivated by hostility towards women but was instead motivated by
personal affection having nothing to do with the employer.
This struggle to recognize harassment based on sexuality is not limited to cases
decided before Meritor. When the court in Saxton upheld summary judgment for the
defendant, it wrote:
Certainly any employee in Saxton's position might have experienced significant
discomfort and distress at the result of her superior's uninvited and unwelcome
advances.... Thus, although it might be reasonable for us to assume that [the
supervisor's] inaccessibility, condescension, impatience, and teasing made
Saxton's life at work subjectively unpleasant, the evidence fails to demonstrate
that his behavior was not "merely offensive."'
166
Thus, although the plaintiff experienced discomfort and unpleasantness, the conduct
was not severe or pervasive enough to establish a hostile work environment. 167 Courts
have deemed this unpleasantness as a part of the working environment that victims of
harassing behavior must tolerate. For example, in Baskerville, the court determined
that "vulgar banter, tinged with sexual innuendo" is inescapable in the workplace and
that Title VII was not meant to eliminate such vulgarity. 16 The court held that the
plaintiff did not have an actionable claim for sexual harassment because the
supervisor's sexual utterances merely created a mildly offensive and unpleasant
working environment.' 
69
When courts view sexual harassment as merely misplaced affection that plaintiffs
must deal with as part of a normal working environment, they fail to recognize that
sexual harassment is motivated by power, just as racial harassment is motivated by
power. 170 Sexual harassment is caused by the frustration men feel over their loss of
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 165.
166. Saxton v. AT&T, 10 F.3d 526, 534-35 (7th Cir. 1993).
167. Id.
168. Baskerville v. Culligan Int'l Co., 50 F.3d 428, 430-31 (7th Cir. 1995).
169. Id.
170. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SExuAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE
OF SEX DISCRIMINATION 174 (1979) ("Sexual harassment perpetuates the interlocked structure
by which women have been kept sexually in thrall to men and at the bottom of the labor market.
Two forces of American society converge: men's control over women's sexuality and capital's
control over employees' work lives."); Katherine M. Franke, What's Wrong with Sexual
Harassment?, 49 STAN. L. REv. 691, 693 (1997) ("[T]he sexual harassment of a woman by a
man is an instance of sexism precisely because the act embodies fundamental gender
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power over women in the workplace.171 The majority of management positions are held
by men, and traditionally men have held higher paying jobs. 7 2 However, women are
gradually being employed in jobs traditionally held by men. 173 Some men feel
threatened by this change in position and therefore act with hostility towards women as
a result of their loss in power. 174 Such hostility often takes the form of sexual
harassment, including behavior based on sexuality.175 Men express their hostility in a
sexual way due to biological and social factors that cause men to believe they can still
have power over women in the context of a sexual relationship. 1
76
The view that sexually harassing behavior is motivated by power and hostility
towards women rather than sexual desire is similar to the argument made for
criminalizing rape. In the 1970s, feminists began to emphasize that rape was a crime of
violence motivated by men's desire to exert power over women. 177 They portrayed the
rapist as a man motivated by sexism, not the passions of sex. 7 8 Feminists emphasized
power over desire in order to combat the traditional tendency to blame the victims for
the rape based on their sexual conduct or appeal. 179 The approach to rape as motivated
by power transformed the focus of rape litigation from the sexual character of the
victim to the violent conduct of the perpetrator. 1
80
This Part has discussed three reasons for the reluctance of courts to treat sexual
harassment and racial harassment in the same way. Historically, racial minorities have
been subject to more severe forms of discrimination than women. Courts have only
reluctantly accepted sexual harassment as a form of sex discrimination; recognition of
racial harassment as a form of racial discrimination came earlier. Finally, courts view
sexual harassment as being motivated by personal affection towards the employee.
This Part, however, has suggested that sexual harassment, like racial harassment, is
motivated by power. This motivation is just one reason for aligning the standards for
racial harassment and sexual harassment.
IV. ALIGNING THE STANDARDS FOR RACIAL HARASSMENT AND SEXUAL
HARASSMENT
Despite the prevalence of the differing treatment of racial harassment and sexual
harassment claims, courts should align the treatment of these claims. There are several
arguments in support of aligning the standards. First, the Supreme Court in both
Meritor and National Railroad required that racial and sexual harassment cases be
stereotypes: men as sexual conquerors and women as sexually conquered, men as masculine
sexual subjects and women as feminine sexual objects.").
171. See MACKINNON, supra note 170, at 199.
172. Hbert, supra note 147.
173. Id.
174. MAcKNNON, supra note 171, at 199 ("[M]ale sexual advances may often derive as
much from fear and hatred of women and a desire to keep them in an inferior place as from a
genuine positive attraction or affection ...."); Hrbert, supra note 147.
175. Hbert, supra note 147.
176. Id.
177. Samual H. Pillsbury, Crimes Against the Heart: Recognizing the Wrongs of
Forced Sex, 35 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 845, 878, 882 (2002).
178. Id. at 882.
179. Id. at 879.
180. Id. at 883.
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treated equally according to the severe or pervasive standard.1 81 Second, the analogy is
appropriate because both racial and sexual minorities share a common history of
deprivation of rights.1 8 2 Third, the motivations behind sexually harassing conduct and
racially harassing conduct are the same-harassers engage in this behavior to exert
power over a subordinate group.
8 3
Aligning the standards, however, should not include the approach that some courts
have taken by importing the tougher severe and pervasive standard of sexual
harassment claims to racial harassment claims.' 8 4 Instead, the sexual harassment
standard should align with the less stringent standard of racial harassment cases.
Because one severe incident of conduct is not actionable, holding racial harassment
plaintiffs to the more stringent severe and pervasive standard of sexual harassment
cases could leave employees exposed to extremely damaging behavior with no legal
recourse.
Interests of minority group women who have been victimized by harassment will
benefit from aligning the standards. The interests of minority group women are harmed
when racial harassment and sexual harassment are treated as two separate types of
discrimination that are subject to two different standards.8 5 In the case of these
women, race and sex intersect. 8 6 For them, racial harassment and sexual harassment
walk hand-in-hand; it is impossible for minority group women to separate their
experiences according to race and sex.' 7 By having the same legal standard for both
types of harassment, it will become easier for minority group women to be successful
on their harassment claims.'88
CONCLUSION
Although it appears that the Supreme Court, in Meritor and National Railroad, has
required that both sexual harassment claims and racial harassment claims be subject to
the severe or pervasive standard, in practice, courts have not followed the Supreme
Court's mandate. The Seventh Circuit has clearly made it tougher for sexual
harassment plaintiffs to be successful than racial harassment plaintiffs by holding
sexual harassment plaintiffs to a more stringent severe and pervasive standard. A
minority of courts have begun to import this stricter standard to cases of racial
harassment. Neither of these approaches is consistent with the severe or pervasive
standard prescribed in Meritor.
There are reasons for the reluctance of courts such as the Seventh Circuit to treat
sexual harassment and racial harassment the same. Historically, racial minorities have
181. See supra Part I.B.
182. See supra Part IL.C
183. See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
184. See supra Part II.C.
185. Debra Dominick, Comment, Title VII: How Recent Developments in the Law of
Sexual Harassment Apply with Equal Force to Claims ofRacial Harassment, 103 DICK. L. REV.
765, 791 (1999); Hbert, supra note 109, at 881.
186. Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L.
REv. 581, 604 (1990).
187. Id.; Dominick, supra note 185, at 791.
188. Hbert, supra note 109, at 881.
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been subject to more severe forms of discrimination than women. Courts have only
reluctantly accepted sexual harassment as a form of sex discrimination; recognition of
racial harassment as a form of racial discrimination came earlier. Finally, courts view
sexual harassment as being motivated by personal affection towards the employee
instead of being motivated by power.
Courts should change their ways and return to the severe or pervasive standard for
both racial harassment and sexual harassment cases. Both groups have historically
been deprived of rights. Also, harassing conduct is motivated by power in both sexual
and racial harassment cases. By aligning the standards of sexual harassment to the less
stringent standards of racial harassment, the courts would be aligning themselves with
the intentions of the Supreme Court in Meritor and National Railroad. In addition, the
consistency found with aligning the standards will make it easier for minority women
to bring harassment claims.
The direction that the courts take in deciding what standards to use could have
implications for open questions of law in future harassment cases. If courts continue to
treat sexual and racial harassment differently when deciding whether conduct creates a
hostile working environment, courts might move away from the analogy between
sexual and racial harassment when deciding open questions of law. Courts might be
less likely to import standards of one type of harassment to the other type of
harassment, making decisions less predictable. However, if courts align the severe or
pervasive standard, they might also be likely to continue the analogy to open issues of
law. This would lead to consistency and predictability for all involved in Title VII
litigation.
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